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Abstract
The goal of the paper is to verify whether the National Bank of Poland (NBP) 
follows pure inflation targeting. The contemporaneous and forward looking, 
numerous Taylor rules estimated with the OLS and GMM methods provided weak 
evidence of any significant importance attached by NBP to output stabilization in 
the reaction function. The strong focus of NBP on its primary target has led to a 
satisfactory performance of the central bank in stabilizing the real economy. This 
suggests the basic conclusion that pure inflation targeters may perform equally 
fine in stabilizing the real economy as countries which officially attach importance 
to output stabilization. 
Key words: Taylor rule, National Bank of Poland’s preferences, performance of 
output stabilization, inflation targeting, inflation-output trade-off 
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1. Introduction
Implementation of inflation targeting (IT) reflects the recognition of low and stable 
inflation’s benefits. Nevertheless, IT framework allows for combining inflation 
stabilization with discretion to respond to output fluctuations. Indeed, the general 
consensus is that short-term real economy stabilization supports long run price 
stability (Rudebusch and Svensson, 1999: 203–262). In Rogoff’s (1985) proposal, 
the reaction function may be represented by deviations of output and inflation from 
socially desired levels. In this matter King (1997) distinguishes two extreme types 
of central banks’ behaviour. An ‘employment nutter’ targets only output and does 
not bother about inflation, while ‘inflation nutter’ is entirely focused on inflation.
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Lack of permanent trade-off between employment and inflation makes the 
employment nutter strategy unsustainable and no major central bank follows 
that approach. Another extremity is an inflation nutter. Intuitively, importance 
attached to deviations of real output from its steady-state values is expected to 
be relatively greater in countries with dual mandate (Judd and Rudebusch, 1998) 
or with a good record of inflation history (De Brouwer and Gilbert, 2005), so 
that they are not afraid to lose credibility while exploiting short term Phillips’ 
curve. A greater focus on inflation seems to be expected in central banks aiming 
to gain credibility, i.e., countries that recently experienced high inflation or when 
IT was introduced as a disinflation strategy, as it happened in Poland. However, 
even within such countries there are convincing reasons to expect a certain dose 
of output stabilization.
When Poland adopted IT in late 1998, price stability became a primary objective 
of NBP. After quick and successful disinflation, it could have been supposed that 
the gained credibility should allow NBP to stabilize output fluctuations without un-
anchoring inflation expectations. However, output stabilization officially plays no 
role in setting policy rates. Moreover, some authors argue that NBP assigns none 
or only slight importance to output gap stabilization. It raises doubts whether the 
Polish monetary policy maximizes social welfare by providing stable prices while 
decreasing output fluctuations at the same time. 
The aim of this article is to verify whether the National Bank of Poland (NBP) 
follows pure inflation targeting. The article contributes to the literature as scarcely 
little research on monetary policy reaction functions is devoted to small, open, 
emerging market economies, such as the Polish one. The asset of the article is 
that the applied thick modeling approach (Granger and Jeon, 2004) allows to 
considerably increase the robustness of the results. The reason is that deciding the 
specification of the ‘true’ reaction function and the variables considered is hard. 
Additionally, although the ‘inflation nutter’ hypothesis is verified only for Poland, 
the results are used for the subsequent, not one-country-oriented discussion and 
concern a wider range of monetary policy regimes. In particular, the article adds 
evidence to the up-to date and unresolved issues of whether dual mandated central 
banks perform better in output stabilization than central banks without such 
statutory goals (Evans, 2014) and adds to discussion about optimal monetary policy 
(Rudebusch and Williams, 2016, Debortoli et al., 2015). The issue is particularly 
relevant today as the majority of the developed (Rosengren, 2014) and developing 
countries (Botrić, 2012) experience low inflation while their unemployment rates 
are above their estimates of full employment. 
The research hypothesis is that NBP assigns significant importance to output 
stabilization while setting interest rates. The results are discussed through the 
lens of NBP’s strategy of monetary policy and achievements in stabilizing 
the real economy. Considering the alleged inferiority of strict inflation 
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targeting regimes, the rejection of the hypothesis would suggest that NBP 
should presumably have suboptimal output and employment performance and 
presumably inferior to countries with significant importance attached to output 
stabilization.
The remaining part of the article is organized as follows: the second section 
reviews the literature on NBP’s symmetrical Taylor rules and discusses the alleged 
consequences for countries that target solely inflation and do not attach significant 
importance to output gap in their reaction functions, the third section describes 
the applied econometric models with their estimation methods, the fourth section 
includes the data description and estimates of the Taylor-type rules in Poland. 
The fifth section discusses the empirical results, followed by the summarized 
conclusions in the sixth section.
2. Literature review
The broad consensus both among academics and practitioners from central banks 
seems to be that central banks should attach some importance to real economic 
activity while maintaining their primary focus on price stability. Indeed, the 
majority of influential studies provide evidence and arguments in favour of 
assigning positive weight to resource utilization (Woodford 2003, Reifschneider 
et al., 2015, English et al., 2015). Although the exact values that ought to be 
attached to the output gap in interest setting differ across the literature, for instance 
Evans (2014) proposes 0.25, Woodford (2003) recommends 0.048, in all papers 
it is usually claimed that households’ welfare benefits when the weight is slightly 
positive. Some economists go further and plea for assigning a considerably greater 
importance to resource utilization (Debortoli et al., 2015) or argue for dual mandate 
implementation (Rosengren, 2014, Friedman, 2008, Meyer, 2002). To sum up, the 
monetary policy of inflation nutters is considered to be suboptimal because it may 
lead to undesirable output and employment performance, ultimately decreasing 
houshold welfare.
Meanwhile, some empirical studies on NBP reaction function advocate that 
the output gap may be insignificant when setting interest rates. Such results are 
discrepant with generally accepted consensus. Possibly inferior performance at 
output stabilization of pure IT regimes seems to be reinforced in Poland as Fendel 
et al. (2011) argued that market participants expected NBP to stabilize both inflation 
and output gaps in the considered ex-ante Taylor rules. Thus, if NBP was indeed an 
inflation nutter, an inconsistency arises between the central bank’s behaviour and its 
public assessment. This discrepancy may lead to misunderstandings with regard to 
the bank’s decisions and decrease NBP’s credibility. 
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One could reasonably expect that the introduction of a free floating exchange rate 
in 2000, inflation under control and well anchored inflation expectations should 
give more room for output stabilization in Poland. On the contrary, Frömmel et 
al. (2011) ascertained that focus of NBP on deviations of inflation from the target 
became even stronger, while output gap coefficients’ estimates turned out to be 
insignificant. Although according to some recent studies NBP assigns positive 
weight to output stabilization in the reaction function (Popescu, 2015, 2014, 
Caraiani, 2013), they seem to be in minority. Paez-Farell (2007) in six out of eight 
different specifications of a TR, obtained estimates of output gap coefficients to be 
statistically insignificant or relatively small otherwise. Similar results were reported 
by other authors (Sznajderska 2014, Baranowski, 2011, Vašiček, 2010). Orlowski 
(2008) ascertained that NBP had the most restrictive course of monetary policy 
among the considered countries in transition. A counterpart of NBP’s monetary 
policy was the Czech monetary policy with a sensible balance between inflation 
control and output stabilization.
Unlike NBP, in many high developed countries the coefficient is argued to be 
positive and statistically significant (Paez-Farrell, 2015, Ilbas et al., 2013, Kam 
et al., 2009, Sauer et al., 2007, Assenmacher-Wesche, 2006). Nevertheless, quite 
surprisingly we may find papers providing evidence that some central banks 
from both advanced (Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy, 2011, Castelnuovo and Surico, 2004, 
Dennis, 2004) and emerging economies (Vašiček, 2010) may not attach significant2 
importance to output gap stabilization, which seems hard to reconcile with the 
flexible IT framework (Svensson, 2009). This may raise doubts whether Poland and 
some other IT regimes with a strong focus on inflation control, such as, for instance, 
New Zealand, Canada or the United Kingdom, experience unfavourable results in 
terms of output and employment stabilization and, therefore, whether such regimes 
require institutional changes.
3. Methodology and method of analysis
We analyse NBP’s reaction function by estimating contemporaneous and forward 
looking Taylor rules (Taylor, 1993) with interest smoothing (Clarida et al., 
2000). In the search for reaction function with statistically significant output gap 
coefficient, we consider different measures of inflation, output gap, time spans, 
explanatory variables and estimation techniques to obtain a range of possible rules. 
Such simple rules in the opinion of Taylor and Williams (2010) have important 
robustness advantages over fully optimal or more complex rules and they work well 
in a variety of models. We search for symmetric effects in the reaction function, as 
it is argued that symmetrical IT helps to stabilize real output (Mishkin, 2001). 
2 or very small if significant.
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We consider the baseline scenario with rt denoting the NBP’s reference rate in 











where πt+h is the CPI annual inflation in period t+h, πt– is the inflation target in 
period t, xt is a measure of HP output gap3, E is the expectation operator, ρ is a 
smoothing parameter and Ωt denotes information set available to the central bank 
while setting the policy rate. We consider both m=1 and m=2 to eliminate serial 
correlation in the error term. Contemporaneous Taylor rules for h=0 are OLS 
estimated, while forward looking Taylor rules to provide for consistent estimations 
in rational expectations models are GMM estimated for h=1 and h=4. For h=1 as 
expectations are unobserved we assume two cases, the first one that the central bank 
is able to predict the survey-based, expected, four quarter inflation, i.e. E{πt+1|Ωt} 
= E{πt+5|Ωt+1} and the second is simply that E{πt+1|Ωt} = πt+1 (i.e., assuming that 
central bank is able to predict the inflation in the next quarter), while for h=4 we use 
survey-based four quarter inflation forecast E{πt+4|Ωt}. Next, we expand the rule by 
deviations of USD and EUR exchange rates χUSD, χ EUR from their long run HP steady 
states (ΦUSD and ΦEUR) and by three dummies ψ, λ and θ which take 1 (0 otherwise) 
during the disinflation period4, during exceptionally high policy rates5 and during 
forward guidance (FG)6, respectively. Following Mehra’s (1997) proposal we add 
secondary market yields of 10 year bonds ϑt as a proxy for expected short term rate 






















where φ, φ, α1, α2, α3 and α4 are structural parameters and εt is an error term.
Alternative GMM estimators may yield substantially different results (Jondeau et 
al., 2004), therefore to find a whole range of reaction functions we estimate the 
parameter vector by both two-step GMM and an iterative procedure. In GMM, if 
the sample is small, including more moment restrictions weakens the precision of 
the estimated weighting matrix (Andersen and Sørensen, 1996). Therefore, at the 
3 (Real GDP – potential GDP)/ potential GDP. While Taylor (1993) used log linear trend of GDP, we 
follow in this respect Judd and Rudebusch (1998).
4 Disinflation period lasted officially to 1Q 2004.
5 Till 3Q 2005 reference rate was above 0.05.
6 Between June 2013 and June 2014.
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beginning we include as instruments only lags of output gap, inflation gap and 
interest rate, which presumably enter the information set Ωt. However, we analyse 
other sets of instruments with their current7 or lagged values as well: exchange rates 
and their gaps, dummies ψ, λ, θ and secondary market yields of 10 year bonds ϑ. 
As robustness check we consider the output gap to be a percentage deviation 
from long-run polynomial trend, while for inflation we consider GDP implicit 
price deflator and core inflation indices. For core inflation measures, we assume 
that E{πt+1|Ωt} = πt+1 and E{πt+5|Ωt} = πt+5 as survey based expected values are 
unavailable. Afterwards, from the numerous specifications of the reaction function 
we exclude “unreasonable” outcomes8 and report on the estimates of the coefficients 
of the Taylor-type rules, which could help to reject the inflation nutter hypothesis. 
Some remaining examples of Taylor-type rules are reported in tables A1 and A2 in 
appendix. Before proceeding, we briefly address the assumption that the analysed 
variables are stationary. Stationarity of both inflation and nominal interest rate is a 
characteristic feature of many theoretical models extensively used by central banks 
(Clarida et al., 2000). Therefore, we also suspect stationarity of the considered time 
series, but to verify it we applied KPSS and ADF unit root tests.
4. Empirical data and analysis
We use quarterly data ranging from 1Q 2000 to 3Q 2015 for Poland. The exception 
were data for core inflation indices, which were available only from 2001 on, while 
data for Polish GDP deflator were available only to 3Q 2014. The selected time span 
covers the inflation targeting regime for Poland introduced in 1998. Nevertheless, 
the starting date of the analysis was selected two years later because up to 2000 
a crawling band system functioned in Poland, which could have possibly altered 
the NBP’s reaction function. To verify whether our analysis is time-invariant we 
perform estimations for the other two periods of time, i.e., from 1Q 2004 and from 
3Q 2005 to 3Q 2015. The justification are the endings of the official disinflation 
period and of policy rates’ lowering as well as Poland’s accession to EU. 
Policy rates (the NBP’s reference rate), private sector’s inflation expectations, core 
inflation indices (CPI net of administered prices, CPI net of most volatile prices, 
CPI net of food and energy prices and 15% trimmed mean) and exchange rates data 
come from NBP, annual CPI inflation data (quarter to the analogous quarter of the 
previous year) were provided by CSO of Poland. Seasonally adjusted harmonized 
7 Only exchange rates may be observed in the given quarter.
8 The unreasonable outcomes include negative or statistically insignificant estimates of the inflation 
gap’s coefficient – which is an obvious violation of IT framework and is discrepant with the historical 
experience of NBP. We also exclude rules with considerably negative, but statistically significant 
estimated values of output gap’s coefficient.
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unemployment rates and real GDP with its growth rates, GDP price deflator, and 
secondary market yields of 10 year bonds were taken from OECD. Data were 
used to construct a large set of Taylor-type rules for Poland and to assess NBP’s 
performance. For all the variables, in spite of the problems with the persistence 
of the time series and the well-known low power of unit root tests, at least one 
test (KPSS, ADF) indicated stationarity (see: Table A3 in appendix). We believe 
this interpretation to be reasonable from the economic point of view in Poland 
after 2000. As a robustness check due to the initial disinflation period in Poland 
we estimated models for the first differences of the reference rate as well. The 
conclusions of the research were not altered. The conclusions were also not altered 
when considering shorter samples (after 2004 and 2005).
In our baseline scenario we have found only one contemporaneous rule (1) with 
statistically significant estimates of the output gap coefficient (Table 1).




r̂* ρ̂ β̂ γ̂ α̂2
(1) contemporaneous
0.01 (0.00) 0.86 (0.00) 0.16 (0.05) 0.14 (0.07) 0.01 (0.00)
R-squared: 0.99, Adjusted R-squared: 0.98, Durbin’s h: 2.82.
(2) contemporaneous
0.00 (0.00) 1.16 (0.13) 0.11 (0.05) 0.09 (0.06) 0.00 (0.00)-0.27 (0.12)
R-squared:0.99, Adjusted R-squared:0.98, DW:1.63, 
Breusch-Godfrey test for autocorrelation up to order 4 
confirms no serial correlation.
(3) E{πt+1|Ωt} = E{πt+5|Ωt+1} 
0.00 (0.00) 0.87 (0.02) 0.17 (0.05) 0.02 (0.04) -
two-step GMM, GMM criterion: Q = 0.14, J test:  
Chi-square(6)=8.46 [0.21], instruments: reference rate (-1), 
current exchange rates of PLN against EUR and USD,  
lags 1 to 3 of inflation gap, and output gap.
(4) E{πt+1|Ωt} = πt+1
0.01 (0.00) 0.86 (0.01) 0.13 (0.01) -0.02 (0.02) -
Iterated GMM, GMM criterion:Q = 0.18(J test: Chi-
square(16)=10.50 [0.84], instruments:lagged reference rate, 
lags 1 to 3 of inflation gap, output gap, current and lagged  
1 to 3 exchange rates of PLN against EUR and USD.
(5) survey based E{πt+4|Ωt} 
0.01 (0.00) 0.86 (0.02) 0.12 (0.05) 0.04 (0.04) -
two-step GMM, GMM criterion: Q=0.14, J test: Chi-
square(6)=8.63 [0.20], instruments: lagged reference rate, 
lags 1 to 3 of inflation gap, output gap.
Note: [p-values] in square brackets. (-) not considered, (standard errors) in round parenthesis, the 
 dummy variable λ was added.
Source: The author’s own calculations on Gretl Software (v. 1.9.92)
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Nevertheless, in (1) we rejected the hypothesis of no serial correlation, which 
suggests that (1) may be spurious regression, which is a frequent problem for 
Taylor rules (Ősterholm, 2005). Evidently, in this matter contemporaneous rule (2) 
with two lags of policy rates is superior to (1), but with a statistically insignificant 
estimate of the output gap coefficient (Table 1).




r̂* ρ̂ β̂ γ̂ φ̂
(6) contemporaneous
0.01 (0.00) 1.04 (0.16) 0.19 (0.06) -0.06 (0.04)
-0.01 
(0.00)-0.33 (0.14)
R-squared:0.94, Adjusted R-squared 0.93, LM test for 
autocorrelation up to order 4, LMF = 2.26, P(F(4,35) > 2.26) 
[0.08].
(7) E{πt+1|Ωt} = E{πt+5|Ωt+1} 
0.01 (0.00) 0.84 (0.04) 0.13 (0.03) -0.12 (0.11) -
Iterated GMM, GMM criterion:Q=0.17, J test:  
Chi-square(7)=7.55 [0.37], instruments: lagged reference 
rate, lags 1 to 2 of inflation gap, output gap, exchange rate 
gaps of PLN against EUR and USD.
(8) E{πt+1|Ωt} = πt+1 
0.00 (0.00) 0.97 (0.07) 0.05 (0.06) 0.03 (0.05) -
2-step GMM, GMM criterion: Q = 0.15, J test: Chi-
square(10) = 6.65 [0.76], instruments: lagged reference rate, 
lags 1 to 3 of inflation gap, output gap, exchange rate gaps 
of PLN against EUR and USD.
(9) survey based E{πt+4|Ωt} 
0.01 (0.00) 0.83 (0.04) 0.11 (0.04) -0.03 (0.09) -
two-step GMM, GMM criterion: Q=0.18, J test:  
Chi-square(7)=7.93 [0.34], instruments: lagged reference 
rate, lags 1 to 2 of inflation gap, output gap, exchange rate 
gaps of PLN against EUR and USD.
Note: [p-values] in square brackets, (-) not considered, (standard errors) in round parenthesis.
Source: The author’s own calculations on Gretl Software (v. 1.9.92)
In appendix we placed more plausible examples of rules – all with statistically 
insignificant estimates of the output gap coefficient. Similarly, all versions and 
parameters’ estimates of forward looking TRs do not allow us to accept the flexible 
inflation targeting hypothesis (see, for example: (3), (4) and (5) in Table 1).
Our evidence is robust with regard to the analysed time span. Neither for the period 
from 1Q 2004 to 3Q 2015 (Table 2) nor for the period from 3Q 2005 to 3Q 2015 
(Table 3) we have not found single statistically significant estimate of the output 
gap coefficient. 
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0.13 (0.03) 0.07 (0.05) -0.02 (0.01)
-0.36 (0.13)
R-squared:0.96, Adjusted R-squared:0.96, DW:1.50,  
Breusch-Godfrey test for autocorrelation up to order 4 
confirms no serial correlation.
Note: For Forward Looking TRs the convergence criterion were not met or the results were 
 implausible.
Source: The author’s own calculations on Gretl Software (v. 1.9.92)
For alternative output gap measurement methods, different periods of time, 
alternative versions of contemporaneous and forward looking TR as well as for CPI 
net of administered prices, CPI net of food and energy prices and 15% trimmed mean, 
we have not found a single reliable rule with significant estimate of the output gap 
coefficient. For CPI net of most volatile prices we report on three contemporaneous 
TRs (11,12,13) in Table 4 and for GDP deflator we have one contemporaneous (14) 
and one forward looking (16) TR with significant output gap’s coefficient (Tables 4, 
5)9. The evidence of γ̂ significancy are, however, quite weak.
Table 4:  Selected alternative scenarios’ estimates for CPI net of most volatile 




r̂* ρ̂ β̂ γ̂ α2 φ̂
(11) contemporaneous
0.01 (0.00) 0.80 (0.03) 0.10 (0.05) 0.14 (0.05) 0.01 (0.00) -
R-squared: 0.98, Adjusted R-squared: 0.98, Durbin’s h: 1.48.
(12) contemporaneous
0.01 (0.00) 0.80 (0.03) 0.12 (0.05) 0.10 (0.05) 0.01 (0.00) -
R-squared: 0.98, Adjusted R-squared: 0.98, Durbin’s h: 1.80.
(13) contemporaneous
0.01 (0.00) 0.80 (0.03) 0.10 (0.05) 0.09 (0.05) 0.01 (0.00) -0.02 (0.01)
R-squared: 0.98, Adjusted R-squared: 0.98, Durbin’s h: 1.26.
Source: The author’s own calculations on Gretl Software (v. 1.9.92)
9 TR(12) and TR(13) used percentage deviation from the long-run polynomial trend as the output gap, 
while remaining TR from Tables 4 and 5 used deviations from HP filtered values.
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First, statistical significance of γ̂ in (11,12,13) in Table 4 is no longer ascertained 
after removal of λ dummy variable. Additionally, in analogous forward looking 
rules γ̂ is insignificant. When contemporaneous and forward looking rules are 
discrepant with each other, as in this example, it seems appropriate to treat the 
results of the latter as more reliable. Numerous researchers claim that forward 
looking reaction function is constistent with the observations of central banks’ 
behaviour (Clarida et al., 2000) and of NBP (Brzoza-Brzezina et al., 2013), while 
forward lookingness is expected from the normative point of view (Haldane and 
Batini, 1998, Svensson, 1997). Moreover, the results of (11,12,13) do not have the 
required stability. In analogous contemporaneous and forward looking rules for the 
period since 2004 onwards, the estimates of the output gap coefficient turned out to 
be insignificant.





r̂* ρ̂ β̂ γ̂ φ̂
(14) contemporaneous
0.00 (0.00) 0.95 (0.02) 0.14 (0.07) 0.10 (0.05) -
R-squared: 0.98, Adjusted R-squared: 0.98, LM test for 
autocorrelation up to order 4, LMF = 2.97, P(F(4,50) > 2.97) 
[0.03], Durbin’s h: 2.89.
(15) contemporaneous
0.00 (0.00) 1.33 (0.13) 0.08 (0.06) 0.05 (0.05) --0.38 (0.12)
R-squared: 0.98, Adjusted R-squared: 0.98, LM test for 
autocorrelation up to order 4, LMF = 1.08, P(F(4,48) > 1.08) 
[0.38], Durbin’s h: −0.79.
(16) E{πt+1|Ωt} = πt+1 
0.01 (0.00) 0.87 (0.01) 0.07 (0.03) 0.09 (0.02) -
Iterated GMM, GMM criterion: Q= 0.18, J test:  
Chi-square(14)= 9.68 [0.78], instruments:lagged reference 
rate, lags 1 to 4 of output gap, gdp deflator, exchange rate 
gaps of PLN against EUR and USD.
(17) E{πt+1|Ωt} = πt+1 
0.01 (0.00) 0.88 (0.02) 0.15 (0.06) -0.02 (0.04) -
2-step GMM, GMM criterion: Q = 0.17, J test:  
Chi-square(14) = 9.21 [0.82], instruments from TR (16).
(18) E{πt+1|Ωt} = πt+1 
0.00 (0.00) 0.91 (0.02) 0.19 (0.07) -0.04 (0.06) -0.02 (0.01)
2-step GMM, GMM criterion: Q = 0.17, J test:  
Chi-square(14) = 9.21 [0.82] instruments: lags 1 to 3 of 
output gap, gdp deflator, current exchange rate of PLN against 
EUR and their first and second lags.
Source: The author’s own calculations on Gretl Software (v. 1.9.92)
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In (14) we rejected the hypothesis of no serial correlation, which suggests the rule 
is spurious regression. When we increased the lag of the reference rate up to 2, γ̂ 
became statistically insignificant (15)10. In turn, (16) with a relatively low value of 
importance attached to inflation seems unreliable. Meanwhile, the long run impact 
of inflation gap on interest rates markedly lower than unity (0.54) does not meet the 
Taylor principle of adjusting policy rates more proportionally than inflation. Such 
an outcome may be regarded as surprising in inflation targeting regimes (Popescu, 
2014, Davig and Leeper, 2007), especially in Poland with strong disinflation attitude 
and considerable successes in controlling inflation. Interestingly in (17) where we 
used the same descriptive variables and instruments11, but once we estimated the 
parameter vector by two-step GMM (a more common approach when estimating 
TR), we received more reliable estimates of the inflation gap coefficient and at the 
same time insignificant role of the output gap in the reaction function (see, Table 5). 
5. Results and discussion
In 1998, for the first time since the beginning of the transformation to a market 
economy, inflation in Poland fell to a single digit value of 8.6%. No surprise then 
that the goal of newly implemented inflation targeting was further disinflation. 
NBP’s strong attitude towards disinflation was clearly stated in official documents 
by acknowledging price stability as the primary objective of the monetary policy. 
Despite not hitting into the inflation bands between 1999 and 2003, price stability 
was achieved relatively soon. In consequence, since the beginning of 2004 the 
continuous inflation target has been set at 2.5% with a band for deviations of +/-1 
percentage points. The problems with meeting the annual target band remained 
between 2004 and 2015, because in more than 70% of quarters the annual inflation 
was outside the target band. However, the overall inflation stabilization of NBP 
may be perceived as succesful as after 2004 the inflation was low and stable while 
the average inflation of 2.34% was very close to the middle of the range.
The majority of our estimations confirm the determination of monetary authorities 
to target inflation by meeting the Taylor principle12. Similarly, literature usually 
indicates a strong attitude of NBP towards inflation stabilization (Vašiček, 2012). 
The exceptional time with violated Taylor principle was evidenced by Baranowski 
and Gajewski (2016) during the annual period of FG, which they argue provided 
evidence for the credibility of this tool. In our forward looking estimations, FG was 
10 In (15) after the removal of the output gap, the inflation gap coefficient becomes statistically 
significant, value: 0.10 (std. err. 0.06) at p-value 0.08.
11 As well as in (18) (Table 5) where exchange rate gaps are added.
12 All the models are first or second order autoregressive lag models, therefore, between the estimated 
coefficients and the long-run coefficients we have the following relation: β̂LR = (1 – ρ)–1β.
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significant but the coeffcient’s estimates were very small (and positive). It seems 
to confirm that FG was credible and helped to make dicisions of NBP predictable. 
Nevertheless, the results may indicate that the implementation of FG was cautious 
as the tool was maintained only when the deviations from the bank’s reaction 
function were small. The monetary policy stress (in the form of actual interest rates 
being far below the rule consistent levels) was therefore not an issue in Poland, 
contrary to the stance in euro area evidenced by Gajewski (2016) when ECB started 
following expansionary monetary policy after the Great Recession.
The inflation avoidance preferences of NBP are, however, not accompanied by 
any official statements associated with responsibilities for output stabilization. On 
the contrary, Article 227 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, states that 
NBP “shall be responsible for the value of the Polish currency”. Only in the Act on 
NBP of 29 August 1997 one may find the vague expression that it should be done 
“while supporting the economic policy of the Government, insofar as this does not 
constrain the pursuit of the basic objective of NBP”. Nevertheless, in the Monetary 
Policy Guidelines (NBP, 2015) it is explained that NBP contributes to sustainable 
economic growth in Poland by ensuring price stability.
Indeed, despite numerous estimations that we obtained following the thick 
modeling approach and despite the fact that Taylor rules turned out to be sensitive 
to data, the estimation methods and samples, empirical results seem to indicate 
rejection of the hypothesis that NBP assigns significant importance to output 
stabilization while setting interest rates. Our results are in line, for instance, with 
Frömmel et al. (2011) and Vašiček (2010), whose estimations suggest that NBP 
may be one of the exceptional countries that belong to the group of inflation 
nutters, which as it seems, exist not only in theory – contrary to what could have 
been expected. It could indicate that NBP by focusing on inflation, may announce 
strong commitment to meet the inflation target and despite several years of inflation 
targeting experience, the bank still aims to increase its credibility.
To the author’s knowledge, only few papers of Popescu (2015, 2014) and 
Caraiani (2013) provide evidence discrepant with ours. Their results might differ 
as the authors applied DSGE models and inserted into Taylor-type rules also 
private credit, real estate market prices or exchange rate. Meanwhile, there is no 
convincing evidence that the Polish monetary authorities ‘leaned against the wind’ 
(such a possibility was only signalled after the Great Recession in case asset bubble 
would appear, Grostal et al., 2015) and the evidence concerning the importance of 
exchange rate for NBP’s decisions are mixed. NBP under the floating exchange rate 
regime may take interventions in the foreign exchange market in case they prove 
necessary for macroeconomic and financial stability. Nevertheless, a considerable 
weakening of the exchange rate’s pass through on CPI inflation was evidenced 
within last years. The downgraded role of this channel has largely structural 
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character assosiated with growing contribution of international companies to the 
output (Kapuściński et al., 2016, p. 12).
As opposed to the exchange rate channel, the impact of NBP’s interest rates 
on consumer inflation is evidenced to remain relatively strong and stabile in 
Poland (Kapuściński et al., 2016, p. 12). The nominal interest rate remains the 
principal instrument of NBP’s monetary policy and most important channel of 
the transimission mechanism (NBP, 2015). This increases the robustness of our 
conclusions concerning the estimated Taylor-type rules in spite of sometimes 
expressed believes about the interest channel’s falling impact on inflation13. The 
relevance of the interest channel in Poland and nominal rates higher than in the 
euro area pose a threat that declining interest rates and easier financing conditions 
after the euroisation may cause boom-bust cycle in domestic demand or in asset 
prices (Brzoza-Brzezina, 2014). The threat outlines an important field for further 
research on possible, preventive measures. 
Another concern was that the evidenced by us attaching no significant importance 
to output gap in the reaction function of NBP could lead to poor real economy 
stabilization. The fears are, however, largely dispelled by the data. NBP achieved 
favourable output stabilization performance14, also in comparison to other post-
transition countries. For example, in the Czech Republic, a country with evidence 
of assigning positive weights to the output gap (Orlowski, 2008) where IT was 
implemented eight months earlier than in Poland, standard deviation of real 
GDP was considerably greater (3%), however the fall in the unemployment rate 
was roughly the same. Similarly, other full-fledged inflation targeters empirically 
proved in some studies to be primarily concerned about inflation, like New Zealand 
(Paez-Farrell, 2015), Canada or the U.K. (Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy, 2011) achieve 
satisfactory stabilization results. In this respect the statement of Friedman (2008) 
that inflation targeting is unlikely to be consistent with pursuing price stability and 
real economy objectives seems to be false. 
The conclusion is contradictory to the results, for example, of Debortoli et al. 
(2015) who by using the Smets and Wouters (2007) model established that the role 
of the output gap ought to be equal or even more important than of inflation in order 
to maximize the household welfare. Our results differ also from those, for instance, 
of Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebel (2007) who claim that non-inflation-targeters 
including dual mandated countries exhibit better macroeconomic performance 
and have more efficient monetary policy than the group of inflation targeters. 
13 Refer to (Kapuściński et al., 2015) for further explanation.
14 Between 2000 and 2015 the overall fall of harmonized unemployment rate was more than 50% (from 
more than 15% to less than 8%) and the standard deviation of the real GDP growth was 1.9%, which 
was close to the value in United States (1.8%) and less than in the United Kingdom (2.1%), for 
instance.
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Nevertheless, their methodology has a crucial caveat that empirical analyses are 
not suited for Poland and presumably for some other inflation targeters too, as 
the authors base their judgement on quandratic loss function that includes besides 
quadratic output deviations also quadratic inflation deviations. In such an approach, 
even a successful disinflating strategy of Poland would make the Polish monetary 
policy inferior to monetary policies of countries with long history of a stable 
inflation. Therefore, in our opinion, if one wishes to include inflation behaviour into 
some indicator of economic performance, a more reliable variable for the countries 
where IT was implemented as a disinflation strategy, would be the magnitude of 
the achieved disinflation or some other measures that allow to account for initial 
conditions (such as, for example, high unemployment) (Lin and Ye, 2009).
The satisfactory results of NBP in terms of output stabilization may indicate that 
regardless of the formal status, NBP is dual-mandated ‘at heart’ (Rosengren, 2014) 
in the sense that output gap or unemployment rates may appear in the reaction 
function as forecasts of future inflation. That in turn would mean that the central 
bank does not need to follow dual mandated strategy to be successful at stabilizing 
the real economy as long as it bothers about meeting its primary goal of stabilizing 
inflation in a forward-looking fashion. As argued by Froyen and Guender (2012), 
a central bank ought to respond to optimal forecasts by using all available 
information, which includes real economy stance. If that was the case, it would 
explain the surprisingly satisfactory stabilization performance of NBP. Therefore, 
our evidence is in line with Putnam and Azzarello (2015) claiming that the 
effectiveness of monetary policy in aiming for full employment may be overstated. 
Ultimately central banks do not have control over real variables, like productivity, 
quality of the labour force, the entrepreneurial capacity of the business community 
or the availability of venture capital (Schwartz and Todd, 2008). 
Our outcomes for Poland could be treated as evidence against assigning particular 
importance to output stabilization in the status of a central bank. Especially that 
to the tentative advantages, possible costs may be apposed. Besides, to those well 
known in the literature and mostly advocated by Friedman (1977) that include, 
among others, the risks for central bank independence (Meltzer, 2013), we may 
add some recent ones associated with undesired consumption dispersion during 
financial frictions (Lee, 2014) and risks associated with quantitative easing (Hoenig, 
2011) that may lead to unintended consequences (White, 2012).
A more detailed study would be necessary in that field, as both external and internal 
factors including fiscal policy were not taken into account, while they exercise their 
impact on the economy with various strengths in particular countries (Krajewski, 
2015, Trenovski and Tashevska, 2015, Yildirim et al., 2015). Nevertheless, our 
outcomes indicate that NBP seems to perform well in stabilizing the real economy 
despite no official importance attached to output stabilization policies.
Maciej Ryczkowski • Poland as an inflation nutter: The story of successful output... 
Zb. rad. Ekon. fak. Rij. • 2016 • vol. 34 • no. 2 • 363-392 377
6. Conclusion
We were not able to accept the hypothesis that NBP assigns significant importance 
to output stabilization in its reaction function. Our empirical evidence indicates that 
the Polish central bank seems to follow pure inflation targeting strategy and meets 
the Taylor principle of adjusting policy rates more than proportionally with inflation 
in majority of estimations. Although it could rise concerns about the performance 
of the real economy, the conservative approach of NBP turned out to be working 
particularly well in practice. The article brings novelty in the evaluation of central 
banks’ output stabilization achievements by providing new facts that the central bank 
without the resource utilization as a statutory goal may perform equally good or even 
better in terms of output stabilization than dual mandated regimes or flexible inflation 
tergeters. Meanwhile, the opposite conclusions were often evidenced in subject 
literature presumably because designed indicators were not appropriately adjusted 
for inflation targeting regimes which experienced periods of significant disinflation. 
The limits of the research are associated with various external and internal factors 
that may affect the performance of output stabilization, besides monetary policy. 
Therefore, future analyses ought to be extended by taking them into account, 
especially by including fiscal policy when assessing the performance of output 
stabilization. Additionally, the inflation avoidance preferences of NBP may pose a 
threat of a boom-bust cycle in domestic demand or in asset prices after joining the 
euro area. We leave this for further research. The satisfactory results of NBP in terms 
of output stabilization may indicate that the output gap or unemployment rate may 
appear in the reaction function as forecasts of future inflation. That in turn suggests 
that central banks may not need to follow dual mandated strategies to be successful 
at stabilizing the real economy as long as they bother about meeting their primary 
goal of stabilizing inflation in a forward-looking fashion. Therefore, assigning official 
importance to output stabilization seems to be questionable because possible costs 
and consequences may outweigh uncertain benefits.
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Poljska kao režim s ciljanom inflacijom:  
priča o uspješnoj stabilizaciji
Maciej Ryczkowski1
Sažetak
Cilj rada je provjeriti slijedi li Narodna banka Poljske (NBP) čisti režim ciljanje 
inflacije. Suvremena i napredna gledišta brojnih Taylorovih pravila procijenjena 
uz pomoć OLS i GMM metoda pružaju slabe dokaze o svim značajnim čimbenicima 
koja NBP pripisuje u postizanju stabilizacije u reakcijskoj funkciji. NBP-ovo 
snažno fokusiranje na primarni cilj dovelo je do zadovoljavajućih rezultata 
središnje banke u stabiliziranju realnog gospodarstva što ukazuje na temeljni 
zaključak da režim ciljanje inflacije može jednako doprinijeti u stabiliziranju 
realnog sektora gospodarstva kao i u zemljama u kojima se službeno pridaje 
važnost izlaznoj stabilizaciji.
Ključne riječi: Taylorovo pravilo, postavke Narodne banke Poljske, rezultati 
izlazne stabilizacije, režim ciljane inflacije, balansiranje između inflacije i 
proizvodnje 
JEL klasifikacija: E52, E58, E30
1 Docent, Nicolaus Copernicus University, Faculty of Economic Sciences and Management, 
Gagarina 13a, 87-100 Toruń, Poljska. Znanstveni interes: monetarna politika. Tel.: +48 60 
353 2394. E-mail: m_ryczkowski@umk.pl.
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- - s.i. s.i. - s.i. s.i.
Note: EX1 denotes exchange rates of PLN against Euro, EX2 denotes zloty/US dollar exchange 
rate, HP index stays for Hodrick-Prescott filter, which was used to calculate the potential 
ouput, while PT stands for polynomial trend. (*) denotes respective estimates after the 
removal of statistically insignificant variables. Note that in some estimated equations we 
did not reject the no serial correlation hypothesis – therefore not all above ‘rules’ should 
be perceived as equally good alternative reaction functions (besides, the majority of the 
regressions include statistically insignificant estimates, which should be removed in a 
final versions of the reaction function). Nevertheless, in all the cases (except for those 
mentioned in the main text in section ‘empirical results’) the estimates of the output gap 
coefficient turned out to be statistically insignificant – and the output gap was in line with 
the a-posteriori method removed to obtain final estimations – however, to save space we 
do not report all of them. Statistically significant estimates (at 0.05) are bolded. AP stands 
for CPI net of administered prices, MV stands for CPI net of most volatile prices, FE 
stands for CPI net of food and energy prices, TM stands for 15% trimmed CPI mean (data 
for core inflation measures are since 1Q 2001), GDP stands for GDP deflator (data only to 
3Q 2014).
Source: The author’s own calculations on Gretl Software (v. 1.9.92)
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(0.05 Critical Value: 0.15,
0.01 Critical Value: 0.21)
Inflation gap  π – π– 0.16 0.13
Expected inflation gap E{πt+h|Ωt} = π–t 0.31 0.13
Output gap (HP) xt 0.25 0.15
Alternative output gap^^ xt 0.26
0.16 (Interpolated p-value 
0.045)
NBP reference rate rt
0.85
(ADF: test statistic:  
-3.02, p-value: 0.03)
0.21
USD/PLN gap χUSD – ΦUSD 0.17 0.14
EUR/PLN gap χEUR – ΦEUR 0.07 0.07
GDP deflator^ 0.37 0.18
CPI net of administered prices* 0.20 0.15
CPI net of most volatile prices* 0.19 0.17 
CPI net of food and energy prices* 0.14 0.15
Fifteen percent trimmed mean* 0.21 0.17
Note: The table presents the results of Kwiatkowski-Philips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test with 
the annual lag order; in case of the reference rate additional ADF test was reported, the 
Akaike Criterion was used to indicate the lag length selecting a lag of 8 quarters and 
testing down from the maximum lag order, *data since Q1 2001, ^ data only up to Q3 
2014, ^^ a percentage deviation from long-run polynomial trend, For all the variables, at 
least one test (KPSS, ADF) indicated stationarity. KPSS test with a constant implies that 
reference rate is I(1), while the test with a trend at the margin of the significance indicates 
that we could decide I(0). Based on ADF test with a constant at 0.05 significance level, 
it might be assumed I(0) too when selecting a lag of 8 quarters and testing down from 
the maximum lag order by the criterion of modified AIC. I(0) is also not rejected basing 
on KPSS test (both with a constant and including trend) at 0.05 significance level after 
2005. Nevertheless, the authors carried out a robustness analysis by estimating Taylor-
type rules with first differences of the reference rate. The conclusions of the research were 
not altered.
Source: The author’s own calculations on Gretl Software (v. 1.9.92)
